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## THE ROLE OF THE SENATE IN FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed to deliver a speech on the subject "The Role of the Senate in Foreign Policy," notwithstanding the rule of germaneness.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from Oregon is recognized.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, throughout the early period of American history it was clearly established in our Constitution and explained and described by the men who wrote the Constitution that the executive branch of the United States shares with the Senate many functions in the field of foreign affairs.

The sharing of the treaty power between the Presidency and the Senate is twice explained by the authors of the Federalist papers, once in describing the powers of the Senate and again in describing the powers of the executive branch.

Again, in justifying the differences in qualifications for House and Senate Members, the Federalist explains that—

The nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires at the same time that the Senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education.

The need for the Senate itself is further explained in these words:

Without a select and stable member of the Government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.

An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?

When one views our entanglements in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic, both of which we undertook on the basis of strong passions and momentary interests but which we have not the slightest idea of how to terminate satisfactorily, I think it is important that attention be called to the effort of leading Senators to fulfill the obligation imposed upon us all to check and to balance the executive branch in the field of foreign policy.

This is what the U.S. Senate is for. It is what the Founding Fathers created the Senate to do—to take the long-range view of actions prompted in "national councils that may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest."

If the Senate does not, today, fulfill the role in foreign affairs that was intended for it, that is more the fault of the Senate itself than of any other agency. In the last 20 years we have actively collaborated in our own decline. We have delegated away to the executive branch too many of the foreign policy duties which were delegated to us by the people of the United States.

The Nation needs the Senate for this original purpose more now than ever before. Our foreign entanglements which have taken the form of executive interventions rather than formal treaties have gone badly both in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic. Both are costing the American people vast sums of money, extensive manpower, and in Vietnam, it is bringing us the growing reality of war as well.

It is my fear but also my expectation that the bombing of North Vietnam will be resumed shortly by executive action and that it will be another link in the chain that is dragging America into all-out but undeclared war.

Pictures will be shown and pointers pointed to justify more air raids in the North and probably in Laos and Cambodia, too, but nothing will ever be told the American people of the privileged American sanctuary in Thailand from whose bases so many of these raids are launched. In fact, the U.S. military bases within South Vietnam are just as illegal as the infiltration from the North, but self-interest has dictated our actions in Vietnam for over a decade and will continue to be used to justify whatever we decide to do.

For the last 2 years, the American Government has had no policy in southeast Asia except the application of force. We have tried to counter local terrorism with everything from chemical warfare to the Strategic Air Command.

Our only answer to enemy successes has been to broaden the geographic scope of the war and to raise the level of fighting, and there is no reason to believe that despite all the failures of these responses, our policymakers will do anything else now but broaden the geographic scope of the war and raise the level of the fighting once again.

### PROPHETIC WARNINGS OF 1963 MANSFIELD REPORT ON VIETNAM

The steadfastness with which our State and Defense Departments have sought military solutions to all the political, economic, and social problems of South Vietnam is epitomized by their rejection of the warnings issued by the majority leader, Mr. MANSFIELD, and the group of Senators that toured southeast Asia in 1963. The 1963 Mansfield report, which is included as an appendix to his current report, is a case study in the difficulties of South Vietnam and the undue optimism which characterized our official pronouncements about that country. I ask unanimous consent that the text of both reports be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, Senator MANSFIELD's observations, submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations on February 25, 1963, contained a skepticism which has been more than justified by the alarming developments of this past year. They urged that we be cautious of the optimism which was coming out of official declarations, for, said Senator MANSFIELD:

At this time, experience under the plan (for strategic hamlets) does not appear adequate for drawing the kind of optimistic conclusions with respect to it which have been drawn.

Elsewhere, Senator MANSFIELD warned that the assumptions on which our policies were based be checked for their validity, and that estimates of length and degree of involvement be carefully considered in light of the deterioration of the South Vietnam political situation.

It is not really surprising that these prophetic warnings were not heeded by the administration at the time. Although the Senator from Montana is a former university professor of Far Eastern history, and although he has served in Congress since 1943, during which time he has carefully followed events and developments in the Far East, there is an article of faith in the Departments of State and Defense which holds that Members of Congress are politicians and that politicians cannot be expert in any international situation.

By way of digression, I am at a loss to understand the vacuity of experts of both the State Department and the Defense Department.

The sad thing, in my judgment, is the lack of qualification of leading advisers of the President of the United States who are advising him on Asian policy.

In my judgment, if our President continues to follow the ill advice of his advisers in the State Department and in the Pentagon, tens of thousands of American boys will be unjustifiably killed in Asia in the next 2 years.

The only force, in my judgment, that now can stop our President from traveling the road to an unjustifiable, massive war in Asia is the American people; and, to the American people from this desk this morning, I say that we must proceed without further delay to make it clear to our President that we do not want a massive war in Asia.

I shall have more to say about the President's response to the 15 of us who sent him a courteous letter, asking him to give careful consideration to proposals for renewing the bombing in Vietnam.

Mr. President, today we are sitting on a razor edge. The American people today are much closer to a holocaust than most of them know. The time has come for the American people to exercise all their rights of political freedom and make perfectly clear to Congress and to the President that this is the time to stop, look, and listen before many thousands of American boys who, in my judgment, have no vital interest in Asia, are sent to Asia to be slaughtered.

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